The Rise of Songhay: From Vassal State to Regional Power

While Mali slowly collapsed under its own weight, an empire came to life at the eastern bend of the Niger that would never be willing to bow; what happened there was an awakening after centuries of waiting rather than a sudden birth.

At the Great Bend of the Niger

The Niger flows from the Guinea Highlands, turns northeast through the Inland Delta near Djenné, almost touches the Sahara at Timbuktu and then bends sharply to the southeast, so that a gigantic arc emerges, drawn as it were in water, and at the highest point of that arc lies Gao.

Gao stood there before Wagadou had a king and before Mali bore a name, since the city that connected the Sahara with the world lay, century after century, on the winning side of every map. From this city, in the fifteenth century, began a movement that would rewrite the balance of power of an entire continent.

The Sunni Dynasty: What the Name Does Not Mean

First a misunderstanding must be cleared away, because the house that ruled Songhay did indeed bear the title Sunni or Sonni, but this has nothing to do with Sunnism in the religious sense. It is a dynastic title from the Songhay itself, roughly translatable as “liberator” or “replacer”, and a Sunni king could be syncretic, as we shall see shortly with Ali Ber, so that the title says something about the transfer of power and not about school of faith.

According to tradition, the Sunni line goes back to a prince named Ali Kolon, who was held hostage at the court of Mali, escaped on horseback, beat off the Malian pursuers and founded the line that would ultimately liberate Songhay. Abderrahman as-Sa’di ﵀ tells this story in the Tarikh al-Sudan with undisguised sympathy for the young escaping prince.

Whether it literally happened that way matters less than what the story tells about the self-image of the Songhay, since they saw themselves not as subordinates who accidentally built an empire, but as a people that had waited for its moment.

The Vassal Who Waited

During the great years of Mansa Musa, Gao stood formally under Malian authority, and Mansa Musa himself visited the city on his return journey from the Hajj in 1324, with descriptions from that time recording how he added Gao to his possessions. Malian governors were appointed, tribute was levied, and the Sunni rulers of Gao bowed, on paper, to the Mansa.

But Gao was never just a provincial capital, for it was a trading metropolis with its own caravan connections to North Africa, its own Muslim community and an aristocracy older than Mali itself, so that Malian rule resembled a loose suzerain relationship rather than direct dominion. The Sunni ruled in practice while Mali collected tribute, and as long as everyone kept to the rules, the system held. What no one in Niani realised was that tribute is not the same as loyalty.

The Songhay aristocracy maintained its own martial traditions, its own cavalry and its own trade networks, and they waited the way men wait who know that every empire cracks eventually.

Mali’s Decline as Opening Move

After 1337, Mali fell into a downward spiral of succession crises and fratricidal bloodbaths, in a continual usurpation of the throne between cousins, uncles and brothers, while the Tuareg took Timbuktu in 1433 and broke open Mali’s northern flank and the western provinces crumbled away. Each generation made Mali smaller, and each shrinkage meant fewer troops to keep Songhay in check and fewer tribute collectors who dared to approach the border towards Gao.

By the middle of the fifteenth century, Mali was a shadow of itself, since the Mansa still ruled in Niani, but his arm no longer reached beyond the Middle Niger: Djenné was practically independent, Timbuktu lay in the Tuareg sphere of influence, and Gao no longer paid tribute but looked out over its own realm. This was the opening the Sunni had been waiting for.

A Geography That Forgives No Mistakes

Before the moment itself falls, the map deserves attention, for Gao lay uniquely. From Gao one could sail to the southeast, deeper into Africa, towards the Hausa states, Lake Chad and Bornu, or to the northwest towards Timbuktu and the Sahara gates, or overland to the north into the desert, towards Tafilalt, Sijilmassa and ultimately Fez, or to the south towards the goldfields of the Akan, the palm oil and the kola nut.

No other city in West Africa had such reach, since Timbuktu was a terminus, Djenné a way station and Niani lay remote, while Gao was a junction.

The Sorko fishermen of the Niger, the Gao farmers and the Songhay cavalry each had their role, and the Sorko controlled the river and formed the core of what would later become the Songhay fleet, a real war fleet of canoes and flat-bottomed boats with which troops could be moved along the Niger. Mali, oriented inland, had never fully built that up, but the Songhay had, and what they maintained on the water was a well-considered military economy.

Sunni Sulayman Dandi: The Quiet Architect

In the usual tellings, one jumps straight from Mali’s decline to Sunni Ali the Great, and in doing so one does injustice to the man who laid the foundation. Sunni Sulayman Dandi began, around 1460, offensive campaigns against Malian positions on the Middle Niger, took Mema, an important Malian outpost, and literally gnawed away the edges of Mali’s influence. The Tarikh al-Fattash, parallel to the chronicle of as-Sa’di ﵀, attributes to him a series of victories that established the pattern: Songhay would henceforth be the offensive aggressor rather than the defensive vassal.

When Sulayman Dandi died in 1464, his successor inherited a state in full expansion rather than a stagnating one, and that successor was Sunni Ali Ber.

The Year 1464

The year 1464 is recorded in Songhay history as the moment when the empire definitively shed its vassal-state identity, since this was the starting signal for a transformation from regional kingdom to empire rather than merely a dynastic succession.

Why precisely 1464 is a question that answers itself once one sees that three things coincided. Mali’s internal weakening had reached the critical point, so that the Mansas in Niani were no longer able to send field armies to the Niger bend, while at the same time the trans-Saharan trade was shifting: the old western route via Awdaghust and Sijilmassa fell into decline, while the eastern route via Tafilalt to Gao and Takedda gained importance, so that Gao lay on the winning route. In addition, weapons technology had changed as well, for the Songhay cavalry, heavily armed and well trained, surpassed the Malian infantry in mobility and striking power. These three factors, none of them accidental, together formed the lubricant with which Sunni Ali could begin his campaigns.

What Songhay Would Come to Mean

Before we meet Ali Ber himself, it is worth looking ahead, for the Songhay Empire that would exist between 1464 and 1591 became the largest empire West Africa had ever seen, larger than Ghana and larger than Mali at its height, stretching from the Senegal basin to the Hausa states in present-day Nigeria, from the salt mines of Taghaza in the north to the goldfields of Bambuk and Bure in the south.

This empire would carry Islam as state ideology further than Mali had ever done, it would bring Timbuktu and Djenné to their ultimate flowering with Sankore, the bookselling streets and a knowledge infrastructure that became famous far into the Muslim world, and it would conduct correspondence with the great scholars of the Maghreb: with Muhammad al-Maghili ﵀ in the Sahara and with Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti ﵀ in Cairo.

And it would end in a bloody collapse, since in 1591 Moroccan arquebusiers would come across the Sahara and shoot an empire a century old to pieces in a single afternoon. That runs ahead, and for now it is enough to say that in 1464 the Sahel was on the verge of getting a new master, a master who would not ask.

Three Peoples, One Court

To understand why Gao could grow into an imperial capital, one must know that the city was the result of centuries of cooperation between three ethnic groups rather than the product of a single one. The Sorko were the fishermen and shipbuilders of the Niger, who in their canoes and flat-bottomed boats were the masters of the water, the Goa, also called Gow, were hunters and warriors and in a later phase suppliers of heavy cavalry, and the Songhay core itself were the farmers and administrators, the political backbone.

This trinity meant that Gao was never dependent on a single source of power, for if fishing slumped, the cavalry still stood, and if the harvest failed, the river remained; it was a diversified economy before that word existed. Under Sunni Ali and later Askia Muhammad, these three groups would each retain a role of their own in the structure of the state, since the river war fleet stood under Sorko command, the heavy cavalry came from the Goa aristocracy and the civil administration remained in Songhay hands, a model that worked because it excluded no one.

Premodern Islamic states in Africa were often as diverse as their neighbours in Europe or Asia rather than ethnic monocultures, and that diversity was a strength.

The River as Backbone

It is easy to dismiss Songhay as “an empire on the Niger”, but the Niger is at once a form of organisation, an economy and an army structure rather than a backdrop. For the Songhay, the Niger was what the Mediterranean was for the Romans: the highway along which everything moved, cargoes and troops, messages and official travellers, since a Songhay boat covered in days what a caravan needed weeks to do. When a farma in Djenné sent word to Gao, that message went via the river and not overland, and when an army had to be moved, that army went partly by boat and partly on horseback, in a coordination that only an empire with river infrastructure could deliver.

This explains why control over Djenné, which Sunni Ali would fight for in 1473, was so fundamental, for Djenné was the southern gate of the river infrastructure, so that whoever held Djenné held the entire middle stretch of the Niger, whoever had Timbuktu as well had the northern connection to the Sahara routes, and whoever had Gao had the east, the Dendi region and the exit to the Hausa states.

The Sorko fishermen were therefore a professional class of river specialists rather than an ethnic group that happened to live on the water, with their own crafts, their own leaders and their own place in the imperial hierarchy, since without them no Songhay fleet, and without a fleet no Songhay Empire.

The Za Inheritance Absorbed

One thread still deserves attention, for in an earlier story the Za dynasty came up, the old royal line that had ruled Gao from its origin and under whom the gold trade around 100 C.E. had become a royal monopoly. The Za did not die out, but were swallowed up by the rising Sunni line, with some Za bloodlines absorbed into the Sunni aristocracy while others disappeared to the periphery.

This means that the Songhay that Sunni Ali would inherit in 1464 was an empire with roots reaching back long before Mali and long before the arrival of Islam in the region, since Gao had continuity of governance of more than a millennium, and the city had, by the time it came under Songhay rule, internalised all the instruments of an imperial capital: a palace tradition, a royal treasury, an aristocratic layering and a diplomatic practice. Sunni Ali found those instruments ready and did not have to invent them.

This nuances the image of “rise” as sudden birth, since Songhay came out of a deep past rather than out of nothing, so that the change of power of 1464 was not so much the birth of an empire as the breakthrough of an empire that had waited for its turn for centuries in the shadow of its larger neighbour.

The Wangara, the Trade, and the Long Shadow

The Wangara, the Islamic trading class that had already flourished under Mali, remained under Songhay the backbone of internal trade and carried Islam southward, to the Akan goldfields and to the coast, so that when later, from the sixteenth century onward, Portuguese and Dutch ships would moor on that coast, they did not arrive among untouched and isolated societies but at trading posts that had for centuries been part of a Muslim network going back to Songhay and its predecessors.

This was a civilisation that built empires, erected mosques and kept bookshops rather than a void, and when we come shortly to Sunni Ali and Askia Muhammad, we are following one part of that same long history.

Weapons, Riders and Boats

One last detail about the military economy of Songhay on the eve of the rise deserves attention, because this explains why the breakthrough became possible at precisely this moment. The Songhay cavalry of the middle of the fifteenth century had access to something Mali in its heyday had never had on this scale, since it possessed horses from the northern trade with Tafilalt and Tuat, iron weapons from its own forges along the Niger and a training tradition going back to the older Za kings. These riders formed a permanent class rather than a body of ad hoc recruits, with land rights in exchange for military service, with succession from father to son and with tactical conventions of their own.

To this was added the fleet, for the river boats of the Sorko were not only fishing vessels deployed as troop transport, but there were also specialised fighting boats with raised decks, with room for archers and with the ability to run ashore quickly and set down troops on a riverbank where the opponent had not dug in.

Whoever could synchronise these two arms, riders and boats, ruled the Niger bend, and precisely because Mali had never truly integrated the boats, the Sunni understood that herein lay their advantage, and under Ali Ber they would raise it to an art form.

The World Around the Niger Bend in 1464

Sunni Sulayman Dandi died, Sunni Ali Ber ascended the throne in Gao, and the world around him changed in character. In Europe, Portugal was preparing for the voyages of discovery of Prince Henry the Navigator, in Morocco the Wattasids were playing a weakening game against the rising Saadians, in Egypt the Mamluks were ruling their last century before the Ottomans came, and in Constantinople, conquered only eleven years earlier by Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror, a new Islamic empire was being built. The world was in motion on all sides.

But on the Niger bend, one man began a reign that would rewrite the relations of an entire continent, a man who, depending on whom one asks, was a genius or a tyrant, a hero or a heretic, and often, as will yet become clear, both at once. The story of Songhay only truly begins when Sunni Ali mounts his horse.

We stand at the threshold of a century that would become fundamental for West Africa, the century in which the largest Islamic empire on Sub-Saharan African soil would blossom, in which Timbuktu would reach its ultimate splendour, and in which at the same time, at the edges, European seafaring began to announce itself in a way that would in time change everything. The things that began on the Niger bend in 1464 would carry on until long after 1591, among the West Africans carried across the Atlantic and beyond, since this has never been a story that stops at Gao: what began there travelled along and survived in guises that are still recognisable.

Sources

• ʿAbd ar-Rahman as-Saʿdi ﵀, Tarikh as-Sudan, chapter 2 on the Sunni dynasty: Ali Kulun and his brother Silman Nari in service at the court of Mali, the secretly prepared escape on horseback, the pursuers routed time and again and the severing of subordination to the sultan of Mali, in the translation by Hunwick, pp. 7–8 (TS ch. 2); and chapter 3 on Mansa Musa, who after his Hajj subjected the Songhay and on his return journey built a mosque outside Gao, pp. 9–10 (TS ch. 3).
• Tarikh al-Fattash, on Sunni Sulayman Dama, also called Dandi, who laid waste Mema after it had broken away from Mali and thereby set the pattern of Songhay expansion, as quoted in Gomez, p. 184.
• John O. Hunwick (trans.), Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire: al-Saʿdi’s Taʾrikh al-sudan down to 1613 and other contemporary documents, Brill, Leiden 2003 (2nd printing; 1st printing 1999), pp. xxxiv–xxxix, xli–xliii, 7–10, 31, 105, 333–334.
  • pp. xxxiv–xxxv: the Songhay horsemen who established themselves over the Sorko at Kukiya; the Songhay chiefs who moved to Gao when North African trade began in the early ninth century; Gao by the tenth century a kingdom at a crossroads of routes; salt and Barbary horses from the north as the basis of the cavalry.
  • pp. xxxvi–xxxvii: Mali extending its hegemony over the Middle Niger at the end of the thirteenth century and leaving the Zuwa in place as tributary rulers; the title Sunni as Manding so-nyi; the Sunnis as a continuation of the Zuwa dynasty, seated at Kukiya under Malian hegemony.
  • pp. xxxviii–xxxix: Mali withdrawing from Timbuktu and Gao by 1438; Sulayman Dama who laid waste Mema and whose reign ended in 1464; Sunni Ali Ber (1464–92) with Gao as capital and residences at Kukiya, Kabara and Tindirma; a well disciplined army led by cavalry, partly built up by his predecessors; the aim of controlling the whole Middle Niger and the gold trade through Jenne and Timbuktu.
  • pp. xli–xliii: the empire that by 1520 stretched from the Senegal to the Air massif and from Borgu to Taghaza; al-Mansur’s 4,000 musketeers of 1590 against swords, spears and arrows; the Hi-koi as commander of the boats and the other offices that already existed under Sunni Ali.
  • pp. 7–10 (TS ch. 2–3): the story of Ali Kulun and Silman Nari; Mansa Musa as the first sultan of Mali to rule Songhay and the mosque outside Gao.
  • p. 31 (TS ch. 7): the Maghsharan Tuareg who ruled Timbuktu for forty years from 837/1433–34.
  • p. 105 (TS ch. 13): Askia Muhammad meeting al-Jalal al-Suyuti ﵀ in the east and seeking his counsel.
  • pp. 333–334: the title Sunni, explained by the Tarikh al-Fattash as representative, replacement (badal) or substitute of the sultan, possibly from Malinke sonyi, subordinate or confidant of the ruler, and thus no indication of a school of belief.
• Michael A. Gomez, African Dominion: A New History of Empire in Early and Medieval West Africa, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2018, pp. 21, 169, 180–182, 184–185, 188, 190, 209–210, 218.
  • p. 21: the Sorko fisherfolk and the Gow hunters who moved upstream from Kukiya to Gao in the late seventh century.
  • p. 169: Mali faltering after Mansa Sulayman through succession disputes and an overstretched administration; Songhay as a reemergence centred on ancient Gao.
  • pp. 180–182: the Zuwa who continued under Malian domination; Ali Kulun who cut the yoke of Mali from the necks of the Songhay; Mansa Musa establishing control over Gao after his Hajj (1326); Timbuktu Malian until the Tuareg takeover of 837/1433–34; the Sunnis living at Kukiya until Sunni Ali built a residence at Gao.
  • pp. 184–185, 188: Sulayman Dama, also called Dandi, and Mema; Sunni Ali’s accession in 869/1464 and his reign of twenty-seven or twenty-eight years; the thirty-four expeditions of the Tarikh al-Fattash; the siege of Djenné, which he left around 878/1473–74.
  • pp. 190, 209–210: the Tondi-farma Muhammad, the future Askia, among Sunni Ali’s officers; everyone a soldier; the cavalry army; the smiths who supplied lances and arrows; the Sorko who built the boats and formed the river fleet under the Hi-koi.
  • p. 218: Sunni Ali as a regionalist without Hajj or diplomacy; the Portuguese reaching Elmina by 1471 and the Congo in 1482.
• John O. Hunwick (ed./trans.), Shariʿa in Songhay: The Replies of al-Maghili to the Questions of Askia al-Hajj Muhammad, Oxford University Press for the British Academy, Oxford 1985, p. 99.
  • p. 99: Askia Muhammad seeking counsel from al-Suyuti ﵀ in Cairo, al-Maghili ﵀ in Gao and qadi Mahmud ﵀ in Timbuktu.